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This paper studies the tax payers “styles” of tax evasion. It starts from a brief theoretical
formulation of the tax payer’s decisional problem which incorporates a psychological
element into the usual expected utility maximisation approach. This psychological
component is founded on the hypothesis that tax payers feel their awareness that they are
stealing their contribution to the tax yield from the other citizens as a moral cost.
The theoretical model was tested by carrying out three experiments involving 90
experimental subjects. The most important finding to emerge from the experiments is that
the traditional theoretical treatment of uncertainty and risk could not be used to provide a
satisfactory explanation of the experimental subjects’ behaviour when faced by the
uncertain choice of evasion. When the experimental subjects had to cope with a repeated
choice problem, they developed a sort of learning strategy, using a trial and error process
to explore the space of alternatives. They thus produced a personal “style” in solving the
uncertainty problem. The paper shows that is possible to produce a concise taxonomy of
these game styles which could be used as the basis for further theoretical analysis.
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This work arose originally as the continuation of a previous research project (Bosco,
Mittone 1995; Mittone, 1997) which analysed the influence of non-monetary factors on the
decision to pay or to evade taxes. The specific intention of Bosco and Mittone was to
study, by means of experiments, the role played by moral constraints in deterring tax
evasion. The experimental devices introduced in their experiments were the publicising of
the results from fiscal audits and the redistribution of tax. The assumption behind the
former mechanism was that people dislike being exposed as "guilty" of evasion (social
blame); the latter device was based on the hypothesis that experimental subjects feel the
fact that they are stealing their contribution to the tax yield from the other participants to be
a moral (Kantian) cost. I shall not present here the results obtained from the one-shot
experiments, because they have been already discussed in the articles just mentioned.
While in Bosco and Mittone the focus of the analysis was mainly on aggregate
behaviours, here it is on individual ones. The second difference between the two works is
that the data in this paper derive from repeated choices experiments, while the results
discussed in Bosco and Mittone and in Mittone were obtained from two separate groups of
one-shot experiments. The objective here is to single out regularities in individual
behaviours, within an experimental framework that reproduces the tax payment context.
The experimental literature on tax evasion has never attempted to come up with a
classification of the different “styles” of tax payment. Normally, comparison among
individual types of tax paying behaviour is restricted to analysis of the effects produced by
economic or psychological factors. It is not my intention here to survey the literature, for
which reason I shall limit myself to citing only two studies which represent good examples
of the experimental approach applied to the study of both the economic and psychological
determinants of tax evasion. Probably the best-known example of investigation into the
role of economic factors is the seminal experiment designed by J. C. Baldry (1985) to test
the effects of net income and of marginal tax rates on tax evasion. Among the earliest
experiments intended to test psychological factors, Webley and Halstead (1986)
investigated the effects of an experimental design which models a real world context,
versus the effects produced by a pure game context. Finally for an extensive treatise on the
experimental approach to tax evasion see Webley, P.Robben, H., Elffers, H.and Hessing,
D. (1991) and the references.
3Although the experimental economics literature on tax evasion covers a wide range of
topics, no study has thoroughly investigated the dynamic response of the individual tax
payer. As said, the aim of this work is to fill this gap by building a  ‘taxonomy’ of
behaviours by identifying groups of subjects that react in almost identical manner to certain
critical economic and psychological factors.
In order to build this taxonomy, I shall utilize the results from three experiments that
form part of a broader research project (a total of eight experiments were conducted) which
constitutes the empirical grounding for this study.
The theoretical premises used to design the experiments are taken from the standard neo-
classical theory of tax evasion; that is, they are drawn from the well known model
developed by Alligham and Sandmo (1972). I shall not discuss the theoretical details here.
Alligham and Sandmo’s basic model is too well known to require illustration, and it
suffices for the purposes of this work to stress that I start from a generic assumption of
“economic rationality”. To be economically rational in the context discussed here entails
the expectation that the experimental subjects will try to maximize some generic expected
utility function. The arguments of this utility function are income (positive relationship
with utility), fines (negative relationship with utility for the obvious reason that a fine
reduces income), and probability of being detected (negative relationship with the utility
from evasion). Supposing, therefore, that the taxpayer's utility depends only on monetary
income, we may write the usual tax evasion expected value (9H  formula:
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] =  -  -  +   -  -  (9 W < W 3 W <H 1 1 1 1pi λ pi λ λ− [1.1]
where:
< is income before taxation;
λ is the percentage of tax evaded (λ = 0 if the taxpayer is perfectly honest, λ = 1 if the
taxpayer is perfectly dishonest);
pi is the probability that evasion will be discovered;
t is the tax rate;
3λ) is the punishment scheme which links the surcharge to the level of evasion1
The taxpayer's problem, given [1.1], is simply that of comparing the value of (9H  with
the net income after taxation. When (9H  = ( )1− W < , the expected utility theory
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 The experiments discussed here assumed that the penalty rate is imposed on evaded tax, an institutional
feature commonly used in many developed countries.
4conventionally assumes the taxpayer’s choice to be discriminatory between risk aversion
and risk attraction.
The theoretical framework was complicated in the experiments discussed here by my
introduction of two psychological devices in the second and third experiment. Specifically,
I introduced a redistribution of the tax yield in the second experiment - prompted to do so
by the results of the one-shot experiments – while in the third experiment I changed the
context from simulation of a tax payment to a pure gamble situation. From a neo-classical
perspective, changing of context from tax payment to pure gamble does not alter anything;
conversely, redistribution of the tax yield may make some difference, because the amount
of money finally given to the subjects changes.
How therefore does [1.1] change if we include the tax yield redistribution? We may
hypothesise that 5 - that is, the amount of money redistributed after taxation - is a function
of the tax payers' attitude towards risk, of total income, and of W. More precisely, if we
hypothesise:
[H1] – that W is a fixed rate,
[H2] – that the government redistributes the tax yield simply by dividing the total amount
of money collected from taxes (without including the fines paid by the evaders detected by
the fiscal audits) into equal parts among taxpayers;
[H3] – the punishment system is the same for all taxpayers.
 We may then say that 5 will depend only on the total income and on the average
prevailing attitude towards risk. Equation [1.1] therefore becomes:
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] =  -   +    -(9 W < W 3 W < 5H5 1 1 1 1pi λ pi λ λ− − − + [1.2]
where:
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and (L 1Q) is the total number of taxpayers.
Inspection of equations [2.1] and [2.2] shows that the nature of the tax payer's
decisional problem is basically the same with or without redistribution. More precisely,
and introducing the traditional assumption of a risk neutral taxpayer, one can expect to
observe different decisions as one moves from the without-redistribution context to that
5with redistribution only when the ratio between the value of the sure choice (pay taxes) and
the value of the uncertain one (to evade) becomes greater than one as a consequence of the
amount of money redistributed. The amount of "sure" income, in fact, increases as a
consequence of redistribution, so that the original ratio ( )1− W < /(9H  of the without-
redistribution lottery changes, becoming ( )[ ]1− +W < 5 (9 H5 . Note that the value of 5 can
only be foreseen by the individual tax payer, as it is highly unrealistic to assume that s/he
has “sure” information on the behaviours of the other tax payers. Hence it follows that the
only way to compute the value of the sure choice is to assume that none of the other tax
payers will pay. The value of the sure income for taxpayer M therefore becomes [ ( )1− W <
M
 +
W< QM / ], and in a similar manner (9H5  changes as well.
Consequently, the main effect expected to ensue from the inclusion of tax yield
redistribution is a reduction in tax evasion due to some form of psychological cost not
captured by any monetary element of the model. As said, this psychological cost is
assumed to relate to some sort of Kantian category: the subjects do not evade because they
regard tax evasion as morally unfair.
It is to be emphasised that both tax yield redistribution and the design of a pure gamble
game, as in the third experiment, were intended mainly to test the robustness of the
taxonomy of behaviours constructed from the data yielded by the first experiment.
The next section begins with a description of the parts of the experimental design
common to all three of the experiments discussed.
7KHGHVLJQRIWKHH[SHULPHQWV
The experiments were run using a computer-aided game designed for this specific
purpose. Thirty subjects participated in each experiment, 15 men and 15 women, all of
them students recruited by announcements on the bulletin board of the Faculty of
Economics. The subjects’ personal data were collected by the staff of the Computable and
Experimental Economics Laboratory. All the experiments were of the same length (60
rounds, a duration that was communicated to the subjects) and they were run by taking the
variables that enter the lottery structure as constant. The values for the lottery were the
following:
a) LQFRPH - 1000 Italian Liras from round 1 until round 48, then 700 Italian Liras;
6b) WD[UDWH - 20% from round 1 until round 10, then 30% from round 11 until round 30, and
finally 40% from round 31 until the end;
c) WD[DXGLWSUREDELOLW\ - 6% from round 1 until round 21, then 10% from round 22 until
round 40, and finally 15% from round 41 until the end;
d) IHHV - the amount of the tax evaded plus a fee equal to the tax evaded multiplied by 4.5;
the tax audit had effect over the current round and the previous three rounds.
To approximate a real life situation more closely, I decided to extend the tax audit over
a period of four rounds. The lottery structure for the dynamic experiments was kept
constantly unfair, independently of variations in the probability of a the tax audit .
The players were not allowed to communicate during the experiment, and they received
information only from the computer screen, which showed the following items of
information:
a) the total net income earned by the player since the beginning of the game,
b) gross income in the active round,
c) the amount of taxes to pay in the active round,
d) the number of the active round.
The subjects underwent a fiscal audit in correspondence to the same rounds but
following two different time-sequences (specifically, the subjects exposed to the first
sequence were investigated in rounds 13, 31, 34, 48, 54, 58, while those  exposed to the
second sequence were investigated in rounds 3, 24, 27, 40, 46, 50).
A further information device in the experiment took the form of a snap interruption: the
computer screen changed and a message appeared informing the subjects that the audit
probability would change after three rounds (this item of information kept the subjects
constantly informed about the relevant parameters of the lottery). When each subject had
read the information on the screen and had taken her/his decision, s/he wrote, using the
computer keyboard, the amount of money that s/he had decided to pay and then waited to
see if s/he had been extracted for a fiscal investigation.
To test the individual response within different contexts, I used three different
experimental designs:
DY1) was the standard experiment;
DY2) was the same as DY1 but with the introduction of the tax yield redistribution;
DY3) was exactly identical to the standard experiment, except that it was designed as a
generic gamble and every reference to the fiscal environment was eliminated (I shall call it
the “gamble experiment” for convenience).
7I shall give more details of the structure of the experiments in the following section,
when I discuss the results.
7KHUHVXOWVDILUVWWD[RQRP\
The data discussed here only concern individual behaviours. Analysing individual
records is a rather complex undertaking, mainly because a relatively large number of
observations are involved (30 subjects for each of the 3 experiments multiplied by 60
rounds each gives a total of 5400 values for each variable considered by the experiment)
and because the individual behaviours displayed marked variability. A first step in
organising the data set is to build some sort of behaviour taxonomy. One may begin
analysis of individual behaviours by plotting the percentage of tax paid in each round and
by looking at the frequency of evasion. The aim is to find one or more general rules of
behaviour.
Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the individual trends in tax payment exhibited by four subjects
taken from the standard experiment (DY1) who were assumed to be representative of four
different “styles” of play. Each graph reports the amount of money due (the continuous
line), the amount of money actually paid by the subject (the dotted line), and the rounds in
which a tax audit took place (the bars).
The first kind of behaviour can be called “absolute stability”. It is displayed by subject
no. 28 (fig. 1), who invariably paid all the tax due (in fact the two lines, the tax due one
and the tax paid one, coincide). In the standard experiment only one subject decided to
adopt this “pure” strategy, while in the experiment with tax yield redistribution
(experiment DY2) 7 subjects  always paid the whole amount of tax due, which confirms
the hypothesis that  tax yield redistribution is a deterrent against tax evasion. The second
kind of behaviour is exemplified by the graph of subject no. 18 (fig. 2). This can be called
“relative stability” because the subject always evaded but followed a variable path, i.e. s/he
changed the amount of money evaded in each round.
8Fig. 1 Tax payments subject 28
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Fig. 2 tax payments subject 18
Standard experiment (DY1)
Round
58
55
52
49
46
43
40
37
34
31
28
25
22
19
16
13
10
7
4
1
V
al
ue
 
(It
. L
ira
s)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Tax due
Tax paid
Audits
Subjects 28 and 18 can be assigned to the same behavioural group even though they
adopted opposite strategies, because they show the same constancy in their attitude towards
risk throughout the  duration of the experiment. In fact, subject 28 was always risk averse
(or risk neutral) while subject 18 was always a risk taker. The characteristic that prevents
9their placement in a single homogeneous behavioural group is the “oscillatory” dynamic
shown by subject 18, who changed the percentage of tax paid in each round, which is
exactly the opposite of the absolute constancy shown by subject 28, who never changed the
percentage of tax paid (always 100%).
Fig. 3 Tax payments subject 0
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Fig. 4 Tax payments subject 8
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The oscillatory trend of the choices made by subject 18 is similar to that followed by all
the other subjects who took part in the standard experiment. It is exemplified by the graph
for subject 0 (fig. 3). Subject 0 followed some sort of random walk dynamic, combined
with a constantly changing attitude towards risk whereby s/he oscillated between total
payment and  partial (or sometimes total) evasion, with a ratio that comes very close to a
perfect 1 to 1. This behaviour, which can be called “pendulum-like” (or, in other words,
“once I pay, once I evade”) is unusual in its regularity (the almost perfect 1 to 1 ratio
between evasion and payment) but it is very common with respect to the variability of the
risk attitude.
Finally, the fourth behaviour is represented by subject 8 (fig. 4). This can be called
“mixed” because in the first part of his/her experimental life this subject adopted a strategy
in some way similar to that chosen by subject 0 (a sort of “pendulum” strategy but with a
longer interval of oscillation and a different ratio between total payment and evasion,
something like: I pay, I evade, I evade, I evade, I pay), while in the second part of his/her
experimental life s/he constantly evaded the whole amount of tax due. This definitive
change in the attitude towards risk, which developed in the course of the experiment, was
evident in no other example in any other experiment, so that subject 8 was unique in
displaying this behaviour.
The simple taxonomy described by using the four graphs in figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 is not
satisfactory, because it does not provide an unambiguous criterion with which to group the
subjects into statistically robust categories. The only unambiguous group  is the one
represented by subject 28. Unfortunately, this kind of behaviour (always pay the entire
amount of tax due) is uncommon (only 1 subject in experiment DY1, 7 subjects in
experiment DY2, and no subject in the gamble experiment DY4). It can therefore be
assumed to be some sort of highly specific behavioural category. Similarly, the strategy
adopted by subject 18 (always evade) can also be assumed to be an extreme behavioural
category, given that almost no other subject chose this style of play (only subject 18 in
experiment DY1, none in experiment DY2 and in experiment DY3, and only 1 in
experiment DY4).
I used a two-step methodology to classify the experimental subjects into homogeneous
categories. In the first step I constructed new data-bases, one per experiment, which
included 30 cases (each case was an individual subject) each characterised by seven
variables chosen as proxies for the following attributes:
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1) NUEVA = number of tax evasions during the experiment → proxy for the degree of
stability of the risk attitude;
2) AVEVA = average amount of money evaded during the experiment → proxy for the
absolute risk propensity;
3) SDEVA = standard deviation of tax evasion → proxy for the degree of variability of the
risk propensity;
4) FINE = total amount of fines paid during the whole experiment → proxy for the total
deterrent effect of the punishment system;
5) NFINE = number of fines paid during the experiment → proxy for the frequency of direct
experience of the punishment system;
6) RSQ = Regression coefficient computed by interpolating the amount of money evaded in
each round with a quadratic curve computed by using time as the only independent
variable → proxy for the degree of similarity of the individual tax payment trend with
the best interpolating function for the whole population;
7) YCUM = Total income cumulated at the end of the experiment → proxy for the degree of
success of the game strategy chosen by the subject.
In the second step of the procedure I ran a cluster analysis using the variables just listed.
The broad idea followed in this analysis was that the dynamic behaviours of the subjects
could be captured by a set of variables summarising the most important characteristics of
the behaviours themselves. The values assumed by these variables should then have helped
to group the subjects into homogenous categories of behaviour.
Among the possible methods available to build clusters  of homogeneous categories, I
decided to use the average linkage between groups method (also called IPGMA,
unweighted pair-group method using arithmetic averages) and to run the cluster using
standardised variables. The use of standardised variables is common in cluster analysis,
given that all cluster techniques are based on some form of comparison between distances,
so that variables measured with large numbers influence the computation of distances more
than do variables measured with small numbers. The standardisation method chosen was a
technique built into the statistical package that I used to run the cluster analysis. It is based
on a system of scores with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The algorithm adopted
by the software (SPSS) subtracts the mean from each value of the variable being
12
standardised, and then divides by the standard deviation of the values. If a standard
deviation is 0, all values are set to 0.
A common way to represent the results obtained from a cluster analysis is to plot a
dendogram. The dendogram plotted running a cluster analysis using the standard
experiment data is shown in fig. 5.
The dendogram gives a graphical representation of the links among the groups of
subjects constructed using the variables just described. Since the clusters move from the
highest level of scattering to the lowest (in the end, there is only one large cluster which
includes all the subjects), the problem is finding a good compromise between the number
of clusters obtained (reasonably small) and the degree of similarity of the subjects
included. One way to solve this problem is to inspect the distance that separate the clusters.
This distance (re-scaled to fall within the range of 1 to 25) is measured on the horizontal
axis, and one is helped in the choice of the best number of clusters by seeing when it
becomes fairly large. A possible level of “cutting” the clusters is represented by the dashed
line in fig. 5 and corresponds to four groups of subjects and to four isolated cases (the
subjects labelled 3, 8, 15 and 28) representing clusters consisting of only one subject. Some
summarising statistics on the clusters are given in table 1, where the variables used to run
the cluster analysis have been augmented by two new variables: NTOTEV which reckons
the number of total evasions, and NTOTPAY which sums the number of times that the
subjects paid the total amount of tax due.
13
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Table 1 can be used to define the four clusters with more than one subject. The largest is
cluster 4 which comprises 12 subjects displaying behaviour that could be called “totally
evade once, then pay the entire tax one or more times”. The variables reported in the two
last columns of table 1 show that the average number of total tax evasions for cluster 4 is
19.5 while the average number of total payments (i.e. when the subject pays the entire tax
due) is 22.16. This means that the subjects belonging to this cluster tend to oscillate
between two opposite kinds of choice with an almost perfect ratio of 1:1. The best example
of this kind of behaviour is provided by the graph of tax payments by subject 17 (fig. 6),
who, with only three exceptions (rounds 17, 46 and 57), always either paid the entire tax or
totally evaded.
14
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Fig. 6 Tax payments subject 17 (cluster 4)
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The second largest cluster by number of members is cluster 2, which includes 6 subjects
whose behaviour can be called “mainly pay the whole tax due and sometimes evade the
entire tax”. Again looking at table 1, one notes that the average number of total payments
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for subjects belonging to this cluster is 36, while the average number of total evasions is
3.6. This behaviour is therefore the reverse of that adopted by the subjects belonging to the
previous cluster (cluster 4), because these subjects show a tendency to adopt fundamentally
stable behaviours, while those belonging to cluster 4 continuously oscillate between totally
opposite choices. Confirmation of this profound difference is provided by the values of the
regression coefficient, which is very low for cluster 4 (RSQ = 0.1) and much higher (the
highest of all clusters with more than one subject) for cluster 2 (RSQ = 0.42). This
difference in the values of RSQ is closely related to the different styles of play, since the
quadratic curve used to interpolate the individual game strategies  cannot fit constantly
oscillating behaviour such as that followed by the subjects belonging to cluster 4.
Although I have distinguished between oscillatory behaviour and stable behaviour, it
would be more correct to say, for the sake of precision, that both the clusters identify
“stable” behaviours, in the sense that the subjects belonging to both these clusters never
changed their strategy of play throughout the entire duration of the experiment. The
fundamental difference between the two clusters is therefore that members of cluster 4
chose a pendulum-like behaviour, as opposed to the quasi-perfect constant behaviour
selected by the subjects of cluster 2. As previously noted, the large majority of subjects
choose to follow the same strategy for the whole duration of the experiment (an exception
to this rule, already commented on, was subject 8, fig. 4), and it seems that the only
learning process undergone by the subjects is represented by an increase in the frequency
of evasions during the course of the experiment for those who experienced the first audit at
round 13 instead of round 3. A good example of the game style chosen by the subjects of
cluster 2 is shown by fig. 7.
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Fig. 7 Tax payments subject 1 (cluster 2)
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The other two clusters with more than one subject are cluster 1, with 5 subjects, and
cluster 6 with 3 subjects. Cluster 1 comprises experimental subjects whose behaviour has
some affinity with the behaviour of the subjects in cluster 4, and which could be “once
evade D SDUW of the tax due, then pay the entire tax one or more times”. The main
difference with respect to cluster 4 is that the members of cluster 1 almost never evade the
whole amount of  tax due, while the subjects in cluster 4 almost never evade less than the
entire tax. Another difference between the two clusters is that the members of cluster 1
alternate payments and evasions in a ratio where tax payment slightly predominates over
tax evasion (the average number of tax evasions, measured by variable NUEVA of table 1, is
24, which corresponds to 40% of the total number of rounds), while the subjects belonging
to cluster 4 to a slight extent prefer to evade rather than pay (NUEVA computed for cluster 4
is 37.8). An example taken from the subjects belonging to cluster 4 is given in fig. 8.
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Fig. 8 Tax payments subject 10 (cluster 1)
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While cluster 1 can be considered some sort of subgroup of cluster 4, this is not the case
of cluster 6, which, although very small, must be kept separate because it represents a quite
different category of behaviour. This cluster could be labelled “mainly evade the whole
amount of tax due or a part of it and sometimes pay”. The value of NUEVA for cluster 6 is
55.6, which means that the subjects belonging to this cluster paid, on average, the entire tax
fewer than five times during their experimental lives. An example of the behaviour adopted
by the subjects belonging to cluster 6 is shown in fig. 9.
Having discussed the four clusters with more than one subject, explanation is required
of the fact that four subjects apparently do not fit any of these four clusters. First of all, one
should bear in mind that cluster analysis is a kind of “qualitative” statistical method that
requires careful interpretation of the results.
Referring once again to the dendogram in fig. 5, one notes that two of the isolated
subjects, specifically subject 8 and subject 15, would respectively join cluster 6 and cluster
1 if the rescaled distance increased from 5.5 to 8.5. Unfortunately, both these aggregations
can be criticised, albeit for different reasons. In the case of subject 8, I have already
pointed out that s/he displays a very special behavioural pattern, having adopted some sort
of dichotomous strategy which splits his/her experimental life into two separate periods.
On the other hand, none of the subjects in cluster 6 ever chose to change his/her game style
at any stage of the experiment (for the sake of precision, the only subject that can be
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coupled with subject 8 is subject 24, who at the end of the experiment decided always to
evade the whole tax, but s/he took this decision only after the 50th round, while subject 8
started this strategy at round 29, i.e. in the middle of the experiment).
The difficulty of joining subject 15 to cluster 1 derives from the fact that, in spite of the
values assumed by some of the variables used by the cluster analysis, this subject actually
behaved in a way much more similar to that followed by the subjects belonging to cluster
6. Inspection of table 1 shows that, with the exception of NUEVA, no other variable of
cluster 6 has values nearer to the values of subject 15 (who corresponds to cluster 7 in table
1) than to those assumed on average by the subjects belonging to cluster 1. Nevertheless, it
is clear from the graph of tax payments by subject 15 (reported in fig. 10) that his/her game
style is very similar to that of the subjects in cluster 6 (“almost never pay; almost always
evade the whole amount of tax due or a part of it”) and quite different from that adopted by
the subjects belonging to cluster 1 (“evade a part of the tax due once, then pay all the
burden one or more times”).
Fig. 9 Tax payments subject 14 (cluster 6)
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Finally to be considered are the two remaining isolated subjects: subject 3 (fig. 11) and
subject 28. Subject 3 could be included in cluster 6, but this time in accordance with the
dendogram, which in fact puts subject 3 very near to cluster 6, while subject 28 should be
left alone because of her/his uniqueness for this experiment. In spite of the statistically
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good proximity of subject 3 with the behaviours of the subjects belonging to cluster 6, it is
worth stressing that his/her game style also differs markedly from that of the other subjects
in cluster 6. This difference regards his/her tendency to adopt a highly constant behaviour,
while his/her cluster mates follow an oscillatory strategy very similar to that adopted by the
majority of the experimental subjects in all the clusters. From an economic point of view,
the behaviour of subject 3 can be coupled with that of subject 28, i.e.  the only subject who
decided always to pay the entire tax. The difference between these two subjects, in fact, is
one of different risk propensities, but they resemble each other in that they interpret the
game by looking at the lotteries structure, which in fact does not change with each round
but remains constant for quite long periods.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the final number of clusters can be reduced to four
clusters with more than one subject (clusters 1, 2, 4, 6 with the inclusion of subject 3,
subject 15 and subject 8) plus a cluster with only one subject, i.e. subject 28. Finally, it is
worth stressing that the  taxonomy of behaviours suggested at the beginning of this section
captured only  part of the entire repertoire of strategies used by the subjects.
Fig. 10 Tax payments subject 15 (cluster 7)
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Fig. 11 Tax payments subject 3 (cluster 3)
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One way to test the robustness of the taxonomy just constructed is to carry out a cluster
analysis using the data from other experiments and ascertain whether the clusters contain
groups of behaviours similar to those obtained with the data from the standard experiment.
Obviously, one cannot expect the result to be a perfect fit with the original categories,
given that cluster analysis always requires some form of interpretation, which inevitably
requires some degree of adaptation of the original taxonomy. This also means that
comparisons among different experiments, for example in order to compare the
numerousness of similar clusters, requires great caution.
The aggregate results from the experiment with tax yield redistribution are those that
differ most from those obtained by the standard experiment. Conversely, the gamble
experiment produced aggregate results that were  most similar to those from the standard
experiment. For this reason, it is more convenient to change the order in which the results
are analysed by testing the taxonomy first on the basis of the data from the gamble
experiment (DY3), and then on the basis of those collected by the tax yield redistribution
experiment (DY2).
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Starting from the dendogram plotted by performing a cluster analysis (fig. 12) on the
gamble experiment (obviously using the same variables just used for the standard
experiment), one immediately notices that “cutting” the dendogram at the same distance
chosen for the dendogram plotted for the standard experiment yields only five clusters,
instead of the eight obtained by experiment DY1. To obtain the same number of clusters, it
is therefore necessary to reduce the distances among the clusters. The results for eight
clusters are given in table 2.
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, We can attempt to derive some correspondences among the clusters from the two
experiments by comparing table 2 with table 1. Recalling the results obtained from the
standard experiment, we have the following main categories (clusters) of behaviour:
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a) category 1TE1P “totally evade once, then pay the entire tax one or more times”;
b) category MPSE “mainly pay the whole tax due and sometimes evade the entire tax”;
c) category 1E1P “evade a part of the tax due once, then pay the entire tax one or more
times”;
d) category MESP “mainly evade the whole amount of tax due or a part of it and
sometimes pay”;
e) category AP “always pay”.
With the exception of category AP, which is a “pure” category, all the other categories
include a moderate mix of behaviours which more or less closely approximate the label
just suggested. This means that if a category becomes sufficiently differentiated, it can give
rise to two or more other sub-categories, and this possibility increases as we expand the
total number of subjects considered. For example, subject 18, who as we saw at the
beginning of this section never paid and was included in cluster 6, could become a member
of a sub-category of category 4 (or give origin to a new category) if we find some other
subjects who adopted his/her game style.
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By considering the results from other experiments we do exactly as just described: we
increase the number of subjects analysed, and consequently we also increase the possibility
of distinguishing among sub-categories of behaviour. Once more, by comparing  table 1
with table 2, which reports the results from the cluster analysis run using the data from the
gamble experiment, we can build a broad structure of correspondences between the clusters
of these two experiments (table 3).
7DE&RUUHVSRQGHQFHVDPRQJFOXVWHUVVWDQGDUGDQGJDPEOHH[SHULPHQWV
Categories Standard
experiment
Gamble experiment Mann-Whitney
test
cat. 1ΤΕ1P “totally
evade once, then pay
the entire tax one or
more times”
cluster 4; 12
subjects
cluster 1; 11 subjects;
cluster 6; 6 subjects (as
a mixed sub-category)
good
cat. MPSE “mainly pay
the whole tax due and
sometimes evade the
entire tax”
cluster 2; 6 subjects cluster 5; 3 subjects;
cluster 7; 3 subjects
(this could become a
sub-category)
very good
cat. 1E1P “evade a part
of the tax due once,
then one or more times
pay the entire tax”
cluster 1; 5 subjects cluster 4; 3 subjects good
cat. MESP “mainly
evade the whole amount
of tax due or a part of it
and sometimes pay”
cluster 6; 3 subjects
+ cluster 3; 1
subject + cluster 5;
1 subject + cluster
7; 1 subject
cluster 2; 2 subjects +
cluster 3; 1 subject
good
cat. AP “always pay” cluster 8; 1 subject
On analysing table 3 one finds that the original categories should be supplemented with
at least two new categories or sub-categories of existing ones. These two new sub-
categories are represented by cluster 6 and cluster 7 of the gamble experiment. Cluster 6 of
the gamble experiment represents some sort of mix between category 1TE1P and category
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1E1P, because the data (and individual graphs, like that of subject 10 reported in fig. 13)
show that the strategy followed by the subjects is something like " totally evade once, then
pay the whole tax due, then evade a part of the tax, then pay the entire tax", and so on,
following the usual quasi-cyclical path.
On the other hand, cluster 7 of the gamble experiment, unlike cluster 6, can be viewed
as an "extreme" sub-category of category MPSE, because the subjects belonging to this
cluster have evaded in only one or two rounds.
One way to verify whether the correspondences shown in table 3 are statistically
significant is to compute the Mann-Whitney test, which allows one to check if the samples
corresponding to the clusters linked in the categories of table 3 can be considered as
extracted from the same statistical population.
Fig. 13 Tax payments subject 10
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The results from the Mann-Whitney test are reported in the appendix (tabs. A1-A8) and
are summarised here with a qualitative judgement in the last column of table 3. The
meanings of the qualitative judgements are the following:
YHU\ JRRG = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally
distributed populations for 6 or more of the cluster variables;
JRRG = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally distributed
populations for at least 4 of the cluster variables;
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IDLUO\ EDG = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally
distributed populations for 3 cluster variables
EDG = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally distributed
populations for 2 or less cluster variables.
The overall results obtained from the Mann-Whitney test are good. We may therefore
conclude that the categories built using the findings of the cluster analysis applied to the
standard experiment can reasonably include also the subjects belonging to the clusters of
the gamble experiment. As we have just seen, two new sub-categories could be added to
the original ones. But the Mann-Whitney test has been computed by aggregating the sub-
categories, and therefore the good results refer to the original categories as if they included
the subjects belonging to the new ones.
The final step in this discussion is to compare the results from the cluster analysis
computed using the data from the experiment with tax yield redistribution (DY2) with
those of the standard experiment.
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The cluster analysis applied to the data of the experiment with redistribution was
conducted using only 23 subjects, because 7 subjects of this experiment belonged to the
“pure” category AP (always pay) and could be therefore be excluded from the sample.
Consequently, the dendogram (shown in fig. 5.32) must be split into 7 clusters. This yields
4 clusters with more than one subject, and 3 individual clusters (subjects 0, 12 and 14
which coincide respectively with clusters 1, 6 and 7), while in the standard experiment
there were 4 individual clusters. Comparing table 5.6 with table 5.9, this time it is rather
more difficult to find clusters from the standard experiment which look sufficiently similar
to some cluster of the redistribution experiment for them to be allocated to the same
category.
 7DE5HGLVWULEXWLRQH[SHULPHQW’<VXPPDU\VWDWLVWLFV 
25,00 121,6 157,0 20600,0 23100,0 4,00 ,23 20,00 35,00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, , , , , , , , ,
19,25 61,51 119,2 32281,0 7809,7 5,25 ,29 9,25 40,75
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
6,23 25,34 29,10 1392,8 2361,4 ,50 ,14 4,34 6,23
32,71 112,7 141,0 29386,4 13781,4 5,71 ,16 12,42 27,28
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
5,43 17,56 22,34 1294,6 1593,6 ,75 ,11 5,65 5,43
12,80 49,08 108,2 34714,0 4631,0 2,40 ,32 7,20 47,20
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5,58 28,64 31,57 1288,8 1903,8 ,54 6,063E 6,49 5,58
6,25 7,98 36,00 35820,5 1058,7 1,75 ,73 ,50 53,75
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
3,40 3,87 17,02 941,0 1032,2 1,25 ,12 ,57 3,40
34,00 183,3 179,0 19350,0 28050,0 6,00 2,100E 28,00 26,00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, , , , , , , , ,
45,00 126,2 125,0 20050,0 23925,0 6,00 ,18 6,00 15,00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, , , , , , , , ,
21,69 75,83 113,4 30942,6 10007,5 4,17 ,31 9,39 38,30
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
12,40 50,30 45,87 5115,0 7758,2 1,87 ,23 7,66 12,40
Mean
N
Std. 
Mean
N
Std.
Mean
 
N
Std.
Mean
 
N
Std. 
Mean
 
N
Std. 
Mean
 
N
Std.
Mean
 
N
Std. 
Mean
N
Std. 
Cluster
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Tot
NUE AVGE SDE YCU FIN NFI RS NTOT NTOTP
Table 5.10 reports the clusters from the redistribution experiment which fit the original
categories constructed  using the standard experiment data. The categories shared by both
experiments are category 1TE1P, category MPSE and category 1E1P. Note that categories
1TE1P and MPSE are those with the highest number of members for all the three
experiments, and they can therefore be considered to be the two dominant types of
behaviour. Note also that cluster 5 from the redistribution experiment should be considered
a sub-category of MPSE because the subjects belonging to this cluster mainly pay the
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whole amount due (as do the members of MPSE), but they never totally evade the entire
tax, while the majority of subjects belonging to MPSE alternate total payments with total
evasions.
7DEOH&RUUHVSRQGHQFHVDPRQJFOXVWHUVVWDQGDUGDQGUHGLVWULEXWLRQH[SHULPHQWV
Categories Standard
experiment
Redistr. experiment Mann-Whitney
test
cat. 1ΤΕ1P “totally
evade once, then pay the
entire tax one or more
times”
cluster 4; 12
subjects
cluster 3; 7 subjects; good
cat. MPSE “mainly pay
the whole tax due and
sometimes evade the
entire tax”
cluster 2; 6 subjects cluster 4; 5 subjects;
cluster 5; 4 subjects
very good
fairly bad
cat. 1E1P “evade a part
of the tax due once, then
one or more times pay
the entire tax”
cluster 1; 5 subjects cluster 2; 4 subjects very good
cat. MESP “mainly
evade the whole amount
of tax due or a part of it
and sometimes pay”
cluster 6; 3 subjects
+ cluster 3; 1
subject + cluster 5;
1 subject + cluster
7; 1 subject
cat. AP “always pay” cluster 8; 1 subject “artificial” cluster; 7
subjects
In this way, 27 subjects from the redistribution experiment find systemisation, while 3
should be organised into a new category. On the other hand, when looking at fig. 5.32 we
discover that these 3 subjects should form a single cluster, and that they have been split
“artificially” because the software was forced to build 7 clusters. Unfortunately, this eighth
cluster is difficult to interpret because its 3 members display behaviours that  only vaguely
resemble each other, and are probably close in the dendogram only because they are not
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sufficiently similar to the other subjects to be included in some other cluster. In fact, if we
return to table 5.9 and look at the values of some variables (e.g. NUEVA or AVEVA)
computed for subject 12, we find that this subject could be added to category 1TE1P as its
“extreme” member, while in terms of the values of other variables s/he is differs too
greatly from the other members. On the other hand, subject 0 may represent a mixed
category midway between the mirror-like categories MESP and MPSE, because s/he chose
to adopt a dichotomous strategy which alternated periods (lasting about10 rounds each) of
strategy MESP and of strategy MPSE. Finally, subject 14 used a double strategy: in the
first two thirds of her/his experimental life (until round 47) s/he played as if s/he belonged
to category MESP but then decided always to evade the entire tax or a part of it.
6RPHFRQFOXVLRQVIURPWKHGDWD
Analysis of the individual data has shown even more clearly that the dynamic of the
subjects’ behaviours is almost impossible to explain using a traditional expected utility
maximisation approach. At the same time, two interesting remarks can be made: the role
played by the tax yield redistribution as a deterrent against tax evasion is confirmed, and
common game styles exist.
The existence of a limited number (about 4-5 main categories) of common game styles
suggests that it should be possible to find some general rule of behaviour on which to base
a theoretical model of individual responses to this kind of decision frame. It is to be
stressed that the choices made by the large majority of subjects are stable (or in other
words, can be considered as a dynamic equilibrium), and that only very few subjects (for
example, subject 8 in the standard experiment) changed game style during the experiment.
Furthermore, the largest category for all the three experiments analysed is the one with the
most cyclical dynamic, i.e. 1TE1P, and this suggests that when subjects must cope with a
situation of repeated choices under risk, they find it very difficult to understand the
probabilistic nature of the problem correctly. They therefore choose to alternate opposite
choices (once evade the whole tax, once pay the whole tax). There is a strong suspicion
that the dynamic experiments produced an environment which induced the subjects to re-
model the probabilistic structure of the problem, and this could provide the starting point
for a theory on the subjective modelling of probability under conditions of risk. It should
be borne in mind, in fact, that the subjects were always perfectly informed about the nature
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of the lotteries confronting them, and therefore had to decide under conditions of risk, not
of uncertainty (here accepting Knight’s (1921) classic distinction between uncertainty and
risk).
It seems that the cognitive complexity of the task assigned to the subjects of the
dynamic experiments (the difficulty of computing the expected value of evasion for each
round) artificially transformed a problem of decision-taking under given probability into a
situation of uncertainty. This latter consideration goes in the same direction as the more
recent criticism on the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” probabilities
(Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992).
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An interesting question concerns the possibility of using the five taxpayer categories
identified by the cluster analysis as a basis for the design of tax policies. One could, in fact,
envisage two main areas of action for the fiscal authorities: the first regards fiscal audit
strategies, the second the design of the punishment scheme.
As is well known, a crucial problem for the tax authorities is how to reduce the
administrative costs of carrying out fiscal audits. The best way to increase the efficiency of
the fiscal police is to give them good “targets”, that is, to reduce the number of
unnecessary audits as much as possible, concentrating investigative effort only on high risk
tax payers. For obvious reasons this selection cannot be performed by concentrating on
individuals, but it is feasible if specific socio-economic categories are selected.
Unfortunately, in modern societies socio-economic groups are generally very large, and
they consequently preclude construction of a good screening system. In this regard, the
results from the cluster analysis just discussed may help to improve the effectiveness of the
screening system. For example, one could investigate whether the opportunities to evade
available to a specific socio-economic group and due to some imperfection in the tax
system fit with the most “dangerous” cluster category, i.e. cat. MESP (mainly evade the
whole amount of tax due or a part of it and sometimes pay).
An example of this kind of correlation is provided by a sub-group of self-employed
workers (e.g. some types of artisan: plumbers, painters, electricians, etc.) who derive their
yearly earned incomes mainly by adding the payments of numerous small professional
services. The parcelling out of the sources of earned income allows reproduction of a tax
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payment style which fits the MESP category because the tax payer is able to hide each
single revenue by not invoicing her/his customers or by under-invoicing the real price2
Remembering that in all the repeated choices experiments discussed here the MESP
category is one of the largest, and that the style of tax payment adopted by its members is
stable behaviour, it seemed reasonable to conclude that a high percentage of tax payers
belonging to the artisan class (and all the other socio-economic groups with the same
characteristics) will adopt the MESP strategy.
This conclusion may seem rather obvious and it is certainly not brand new: in fact, we
do not need to run a cluster analysis to discover that craftsmen often belong to the
persistent tax evader category. Nevertheless the results from the cluster analysis just
discussed suggest a specific two-step fiscal audit strategy:
a) in the first step, the fiscal authority carefully analyses whether the conditions of tax
payment allowed to a given socio-economic group may give rise to MESP behaviours,
thus making a first selection of the potential candidates for fiscal audits;
b) in the second step, remembering that the tax payers belonging to the MESP category
seemed very reluctant to change their style of tax evasion even when they have been
detected and punished, the fiscal authority should put each tax payer discovered as
MESP in a special “high risk” audit group, monitoring her/him on a regular basis.
It seems reasonable to expect that this two-step procedure, and in particular the
knowledge of running the risk of becoming a member not only of the “potential evaders
category” but also of the very undesirable closely monitored group, should work as a
strong deterrent to tax evasion.
The largest cluster category, i.e. cat. 1TE1P (totally evade once, then pay the entire tax
one or more times), offers further suggestions for modelling  audit strategy. The members
of this category seemed unable to correctly evaluate the risk of being detected and
punished, oscillating between two opposite behaviours, totally pay or totally evade, as if
they were confronted by a probability of being audited that changed dichotomously (once
high probability then low probability), whereas, as we know, this kind of change never
occurred in the experiments. Therefore a good audit strategyto counter their attitude
towards tax evasion, would be that of extending the tax audit over the longest period
possible. This device should force the 1TE1P tax payers to build a mental representation of
the probability of being audited along some sort of time continuum. The objective of this
                                                
2
 This form of tax evasion in very common in many developed countries, especially in Italy.
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kind of fiscal audit policy should be to convince those tax payers that might fall into the
1TE1P category to switch their behaviours to the AP (always pay) category, as a response
to a probability of being punished which is perceived as constant over time.
The second area of intervention by the fiscal authorities that might benefit from the
results of cluster analysis is that of the punishment system. The most effective punishment
system against the most dangerous evader category, i.e. cat. MESP, is probably a
progressive one. The tax evaders belonging to the MESP category are indifferent to how
many times they have been detected and punished; but this behaviour is probably due to
the fact that the value of the fines in the experiments was independent of the number of tax
evasions. This means that the fee applied to each tax evasion was always the same (4.5
times the amount of tax evaded), independently of how many times the tax payer had
evaded. Changing this punishment system to a progressive one, that is, a system which
increases the fines as the number of evasions detected increases (e.g. 4.5 for the first tax
evasion, then 5.5 the second, 6.5 the third and so on), would probably break the
behavioural pattern of MESP tax evaders.
Similarly, also the tax evaders belonging to category 1TE1P could be forced to change
their behaviour by using a specific punishment system which applies higher fines when the
tax evasion is total or very near to total. Admitting that these tax evaders find it difficult to
model the audit probability, and remembering that this cognitive (computational)
constraint induces them to adopt a dichotomous behaviour - evade or pay the entire amount
of tax due - a system that punishes total evasion very severely should break the basis of
their strategy. This system in fact should force them, when they have decided to evade, to
reject the easy choice of total evasion, because it becomes much less dangerous to
modulate the amount of money evaded. Given their computational limitations, this could
increase the number of honest income declarations, because they  involve no additional
cognitive cost.
Unfortunately these last considerations are not explicitly supported by the experimental
results and may therefore form the subject of further experiments.
A final question prompted by the results from cluster analysis is the following: is there
some correlation between the styles of tax payment and particular socio-economic
indicators like  income, level of education and so on?  Finding a relationship of this kind
might help to concentrate fiscal audits on those tax payers with the highest probability of
falling into the high risk categories. Unfortunately, I did not collect this kind of
information on the experimental subjects and therefore cannot verify this hypothesis unless
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I call the experimental subjects back for further inquiry. On the other hand, it is worth
remembering that all the subjects used in the experiments were university students, and
therefore share numerous common socio-economic characteristics. It follows that they are
not the best possible sample with which to verify the existence of a correlation between
styles of evasion and many of the indicators just suggested.
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